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Abstract The Children’s Negative Cognitive Error
Questionnaire (CNCEQ) is commonly used to measure
four errors in young people’s thinking, but research has
failed to support the factorial validity of the measure. The
primary objective of the present study was to examine the
factor structure of a reﬁned and extended version of the
CNCEQ. Revision of the CNCEQ involved the exclusion
of items rated as contaminated, and the addition of items
measuring cognitive errors closely associated with anxiety
(‘threat conclusion’ and ‘underestimation of the ability to
cope’). A secondary objective was to determine the relation
between the negative cognitive errors and anxiety. Princi-
pal component analysis of data from 481 children and
adolescents indicated ﬁve distinct negative cognitive error
subscales labeled ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’,
‘personalizing without mind reading’, ‘selective abstrac-
tion’, ‘overgeneralizing’, and ‘mind reading’ which con-
tained the new ‘threat conclusion’ items. Conﬁrmatory
factor analysis in an independent sample of 295 children
and adolescents yielded further support for the ﬁve-factor
solution. All cognitive errors except ‘selective abstraction’
were correlated with anxiety. Multiple regression analysis
indicated that the strongest predictors of anxiety were the
two subscales containing new items, namely ‘underesti-
mation of the ability to cope’ and ‘mind reading’. The
results are discussed with respect to further development of
the instrument so as to advance the assessment of distorted
cognitive processing in young people with internalizing
symptoms.
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Distorted cognitive processing is important to theoretical
and clinical formulations of anxiety and depression in
young people and it is often targeted during cognitive-
behavioural interventions (e.g., Barrett et al. 2000; Brent
and Poling 1997; Curry et al. 2005; Stallard 2005).
Assessment instruments have been developed to measure
distorted cognitive processing in depressed youth (e.g., the
Children’s Attributional Style Questionnaire Revised,
Thompson et al. 1998; the Children’s Dysfunctional Atti-
tude Scale, Abela and Sullivan 2003) and in anxious youth
(e.g., Barrett et al. 1996;B o ¨gels and Zigterman 2000).
Most of these instruments assess only one or two aspects of
distorted cognitive processing. For example, the ambiguous
situations were used by Barrett et al. (1996) to assess
‘threat interpretations’ and by Bo ¨gels and Zigterman
(2000) to assess ‘threat interpretations’ and ‘coping abili-
ties’. An instrument which assesses a broader range of
constructs related to distorted cognitive processing is the
Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire
(CNCEQ; Leitenberg et al. 1986). The CNCEQ measures
distorted processing in the form of four negative cognitive
errors: catastrophizing, overgeneralizing, personalizing,
and selective abstraction. The errors have been variously
identiﬁed among depressed young people (e.g., Kempton
et al. 1994; Leitenberg, et al. 1986), anxious young people
(e.g., Watts and Weems 2006; Weems et al. 2001, 2007),
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ety (e.g., Barriga et al. 2000; Epkins 2000; Leung and
Wong 1998).
The CNCEQ was modelled after the Cognitive Error
Questionnaire (CEQ; Lefebvre 1981) for adults, an
instrument designed to measure cognitive errors associated
with Beck et al. (1979) cognitive theory of depression. For
that reason, it might be regarded as surprising that the
CNCEQ has been widely used to assess distorted cognitive
processing in anxious youth. The CNCEQ does not mea-
sure two cognitive errors commonly referred to in cogni-
tive theories of anxiety (e.g., Beck et al. 1985; Mathews
and MacLeod 1994; Weems et al. 2007), namely: ‘threat
conclusion’ and ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’.
Research has indicated that ‘threat conclusion’ is indeed
characteristic of anxious young people (Barrett et al. 1996;
Bell-Dolan 1995;B o ¨gels and Zigterman 2000; Creswell
et al. 2005; Hadwin et al. 2006; Muris et al. 2000)a si s
an ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’ (Bo ¨gels and
Zigterman 2000; Weems et al. 2007).
The utility of the CNCEQ for advancing theory and
practice associated with internalizing problems in young
people is also hampered by the limited empirical support
for the differentiation of the four errors included in the
CNCEQ. Very few studies have examined the psycho-
metric validity of the theoretically-derived cognitive
errors supposedly measured by the CNCEQ, even though
the instrument is frequently used to measure these cog-
nitive errors. In the initial psychometric study of the
CNCEQ (Leitenberg et al. 1986), there was no exami-
nation of the instrument’s factor structure. Cole and
Turner (1993) were the ﬁrst to investigate the factor
structure of the CNCEQ, using a conﬁrmatory factor
analytic approach. Contrary to expectations, support was
found for a model which included just one general factor.
Subsequently Messer et al. (1994) investigated the fac-
torial validity of the CNCEQ using a principal compo-
nents analysis (PCA). One of four empirically-derived
components accounted for the majority of the variance,
items loaded on multiple components, and the compo-
nents did not correspond with hypothesized item group-
ings. The researchers ultimately opted for a single factor
solution. More recently, Stewart et al. (2004) evaluated
the CNCEQ in a community sample of adolescents from
the USA and Hong Kong. Consistent with the previous
studies, factor analysis indicated that all 24 items loaded
onto a single factor. The only study proffering empirical
support for separate cognitive errors is that of Karakaya
et al. (2007), which is based on a Turkish version of the
CNCEQ. Using PCA the authors identiﬁed three compo-
nents which they labeled ‘catastrophizing’, ‘personaliz-
ing’, and ‘selective abstraction’. Items associated with
the fourth cognitive error in the CNCEQ (i.e.,
‘overgeneralizing’) loaded on the other three components.
Several reported loadings did not approach the minimal
level recommended for PCAs (i.e., .32, Tabachnick and
Fidell 2007), and there was insufﬁcient information pro-
vided about the cross-loadings. In short, factor analyses
have not supported the presence of the separate negative
cognitive errors presumably measured by the CNCEQ.
Further, Weems et al. (2007) reported high and signiﬁcant
correlations (i.e., [.60) between the cognitive error sub-
scales, pointing to overlap across these cognitive
constructs.
The relative lack of research support for the existence of
distinct cognitive errors in the CNCEQ may be explained
by several factors. In line with the notion of negative
cognitivity (e.g., Messer et al. 1994), it is possible that
cognitive errors are not differentially related to the narrow-
band conceptualizations of internalizing behaviour. Indeed,
studies which have examined relationships between cog-
nitive errors and anxiety and depression have yielded
mixed ﬁndings, which may be regarded as support for the
notion of negative cognitivity. For example, Weems et al.
(2001) found that ‘catastrophizing’ was one of the strongest
predictors of anxiety but not of depression, whereas Epkins
(1996) found that there was no difference between anxious
and depressed groups with respect to ‘catastrophizing’.
Similarly, ‘overgeneralizing’ has been found to be pre-
dictive of anxiety and depression (Weems et al. 2001), of
anxiety alone (Epkins 1996), and of depression alone
(Leitenberg et al. 1986). On the other hand, some consis-
tent ﬁndings have emerged with respect to the presence of
speciﬁc cognitive errors in anxiety versus depression.
‘Selective abstraction’ is more commonly associated with
depression than with anxiety (e.g., Leitenberg et al. 1986;
Weems et al. 2001, 2007), and ‘personalizing’ seems to be
predictive of anxiety and not of depression (e.g., Epkins
1996; Weems et al. 2001).
Another possible explanation for the lack of research
support for the existence of distinct cognitive errors
relates to the construction of the CNCEQ. The items
designed to measure speciﬁc errors may lack speciﬁcity.
That is, the ‘‘thought’’ intended to reﬂect a speciﬁc cog-
nitive error (e.g., ‘‘They probably won’t pick me either’’
to measure overgeneralizing) may bear some resemblance
to another cognitive error (e.g., personalizing). Indeed, the
clinical practice of cognitive therapy supports the idea
that the cognitive errors are not always conceptually
discrete (e.g., Wills 2009). Not surprisingly then, when
those involved in the development of the adult CEQ tried
to assign thoughts to the seven cognitive error categories
of Beck et al. (1979), considerable overlap between error
categories was observed. Consequently some of the errors
were combined, resulting in the four negative cognitive
error categories purportedly measured by the CEQ and the
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1 While the combination of cognitive error cat-
egories enhanced raters’ discrimination among the smaller
number of error categories, it may also have reduced the
speciﬁcity of the resulting cognitive error constructs.
Despiteitsshortcomings,theCNCEQhasshownpromise
as a sensitive measure of treatment-related change in the
cognitive processing of depressed young people (Kolko
et al. 2000) and anxious young people (Silverman et al.
1999). Nevertheless, in its current form the CNCEQ appears
inadequatetoanswer calls forimprovedcognitivemodelsof
the development, maintenance, and treatment of psychopa-
thology in youth. In particular, there is still a need to
determine the overlapping and distinctive cognitive factors
associated with narrow-band conceptualizations of psycho-
pathology such as anxiety versus depression (Abela and
Hankin 2008;Epkins 2000;Messer etal. 1994;Weems etal.
2001). Support for the existence of unique cognitive phe-
nomena represented by speciﬁc cognitive errors could pro-
vide more direction for cognitive therapists addressing the
distorted cognitive processing of their clients (Yurica and
DiTomasso 2005), including young clients (Alfano et al.
2002;Kempton,etal.1994).OveradecadeagoMesseretal.
(1994)arguedfortheneedtoreﬁnetheCNCEQ,andtodate,
this task has not been undertaken. Further development of
the CNCEQ ought to focus upon the lack of empirical sup-
portforthepresence ofthefourcurrenttheoreticallyderived
cognitive errors, and the absence of items to assess errors
now commonly associated with anxiety in youth.
The primary objective of the current study was to
determine whether a reﬁnement and extension of the
CNCEQ would lead to the identiﬁcation of separate factors
representing hypothesized cognitive error categories. This
would involve the exclusion of items which appear to
reﬂect multiple cognitive errors and the addition of items
which measure ‘threat conclusion’ and ‘underestimation of
the ability to cope’. It was anticipated that the revisions
made to the CNCEQ would have consequences for the
factor structure of the instrument, whereby items assessing
distinct cognitive error categories would load on separate
components. The internal consistency, intra- and inter-item
correlations, inter-subscale correlations, and test–retest
reliability of the revised CNCEQ were also investigated.
The secondary objective was to examine the extent to
which the newly added negative cognitive errors associated
with anxiety indeed predict anxiety. In line with the cog-
nitive theory of anxiety (e.g., Beck et al. 1985) and
empirical research (e.g., Bo ¨gels and Zigterman 2000)w e
expected that the cognitive errors ‘threat conclusion’ and
‘underestimation of the ability to cope’ would account for a
signiﬁcant amount of the variance in anxiety.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
A revised version of the CNCEQ (CNCEQ-R; described
below) was administered to two samples of young people
(sample 1, N = 514; sample 2, N = 304) drawn from nine
elementary and secondary public schools in the southwest
of the Netherlands. The children and adolescents in sample
1 also completed a measure of anxiety. Participants with
any amount of missing data on study measures were
removed from the sample (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007),
yielding ﬁnal samples of 481 (sample 1) and 295 (sample
2). In sample 1, participants were aged between 9 and
18 years (M = 14.27; SD = 1.79) and 58% were girls. The
majority (69%) had a Dutch background, 6.4% were Su-
rinamese, 6.2% were Antillean, 3.7% were Turkish, 2.5%
were Moroccan and 11.4% were of other ethnic back-
grounds. Sample 2 included participants aged between 9
and 17 years (M = 13.14; SD = 2.10) and 52% were boys.
The majority (89%) had a Dutch background, 2% were
Surinamese, 1.4% were Turkish, 1.4% were Moroccan and
5.4% were of other ethnic backgrounds.
The study was carried out according to the regulations
and with the approval of the Psychology Ethics Committee
of the University. Participation was voluntary and anony-
mous. Parental consent was required as was participants’
assent. The ﬁve children and adolescents without parental
consent were not administered the measures. Participants
were administered a booklet of measures in a classroom
setting during a free period in school or after school hours.
A teacher and at least one masters-level psychology student
were present in the classroom at the time of assessment. In
sample 1, a measure of anxiety was administered after
administration of the CNCEQ-R. Three weeks after the ﬁrst
administration 35 participants from sample 1 completed the
CNCEQ-R for a second time, enabling measurement of the
test–retest reliability of the measure.
Measures
Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire-
Revised
A revised version of the CNCEQ was derived as follows.
Firstly, permission to prepare a Dutch, adapted version of
the 24-item CNCEQ was obtained from the original author
1 Overgeneralizing’ resulted from the combination of Beck et al.’s
(1979) ‘overgeneralizing’ and ‘presuming temporal causality’; ‘per-
sonalizing’ was a combination of ‘excessive responsibility’ and ‘self-
reference’; ‘selective abstraction’ was a combination of ‘selective
abstraction’ and ‘dichotomous thinking’; and ‘catastrophizing’ was
able to be maintained as an independent category (i.e., without
merging it with other categories).
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Procedures for the translation and cross-cultural adaptation
of the measure followed those recommended by van
Widenfelt et al. (2005).
2 Secondly, eight new items were
developed, four of which were intended to measure ‘threat
conclusion’ (i.e., interpretation of ambiguous situations as
threatening) and four intended to measure ‘underestimation
of the ability to cope’ (i.e., the tendency to judge oneself as
unable to cope with potentially threatening situations).
These items were developed by a team comprising master-
and bachelor-level psychology students under the super-
vision of the ﬁrst author. The format for each new item
followed the format used for the items in the original
CNCEQ. A 2- to 3-line description of a hypothetical situ-
ation was followed by a statement in the form of a thought
about the situation. The thought reﬂected the cognitive
error intended to be measured by the speciﬁc item. Par-
ticipants were asked to imagine that the situation is hap-
pening to them and then to rate how similar the associated
thought is to how they would think in that situation, using a
5-point scale from ‘‘not at all like I would think’’ (1) to
‘‘almost exactly like I would think’’ (5). The hypothetical
situations developed for the ‘threat conclusion’ items
revolved around social threat (three items) or physical
threat (one item). For example: You are giving a talk in
your class at school. You have just begun when some of
your classmates suddenly start to laugh. The associated
thought to be rated by subjects is: ‘‘They think I am not
doing a good job’’. The situations for the ‘underestimation
of the ability to cope’ items covered various content areas:
swimming with others, being busy with academic and
social activities, moving home and changing school, and
social interaction while shopping. For example: Because
you are moving, you will go to a different school after the
summer, make new friends and get used to a new place.
The associated thought is: ‘‘I will not be able to handle all
these new things.’’ Following Leitenberg et al. (1986),
situations associated with family life were avoided to
prevent a sense of intrusiveness for subjects (or their par-
ents). Newly developed items were interspersed among the
items of the original CNCEQ in a random order. Thirdly,
the interim 32-item questionnaire was piloted in a sample
of 15 young people between 10 and 18 years of age, testing
for the readability of the items. The level of imaginability
(i.e., whether children could imagine being in a cer-
tain situation) was also assessed. The qualitative responses
of piloting subjects lead to several minor changes in the
wording of the items.
Finally, the ﬁrst and second authors inspected each of
the 32 items in order to identify items warranting exclusion
on the basis of three decision rules. First, an item was
excluded if it was not clearly representative of the intended
cognitive error. An example of an item excluded on the
basis of the ﬁrst decision rule is item 10 from the original
CNCEQ: You went to a party with one of your friends.
When you ﬁrst got there your friend hung around with some
other kids instead of you. Later you and your friend decide
to stop at his/her house for a snack before you go home.
Later that night you think, ‘‘My friend didn’t seem to want
to hang around with me tonight.’’ This item, intended to
measure ‘selective abstraction’, was excluded because
positive experiences with the friend were insufﬁciently
represented in the hypothetical situation to make it a clear
case of selective abstraction. Second, an item was excluded
if it simultaneously represented more than one of the six
cognitive errors (i.e., ‘catastrophizing’, ‘overgeneralizing’,
‘personalizing’, ‘selective abstraction’, ‘threat conclusions’
and ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’). An example
of an item excluded on the basis of the second decision rule
is item 22 from the original CNCEQ: Your cousin calls you
to ask if you’d like to go on a long bike ride. You think,
‘‘I probably won’t be able to keep up and people will make
fun of me.’’ This item, intended to measure ‘catastrophiz-
ing’, was excluded because it also reﬂected ‘underestima-
tion of the ability to cope’. A third decision-rule applied to
overlap with cognitive errors beyond the six errors speci-
ﬁed above. Almost by deﬁnition, ‘selective abstraction’
incorporates the error of ‘black-and-white thinking’:
‘‘Selective abstraction—the process of exclusively focus-
ing on one negative aspect or detail of a situation, mag-
nifying the importance of that detail, thereby casting the
whole situation in a negative context [emphasis added]’’
(YuricaandDiTomasso2005,p.119).Thus,while‘selective
abstraction’ items could reﬂect ‘black-and-white thinking’,
any other items which contained ‘black-and-white thinking’
were excluded (e.g., a deleted ‘overgeneralizing’ item was:
Last week you played softball and struck out twice. Today
some kids from your class ask you to play soccer. You think,
‘‘There’s no sense playing, I’m no good at sports.’’). ‘Mind
reading’ is a cognitive error which has been deﬁned as fol-
lows: ‘‘One’s arbitrary conclusion that someone is reacting
negatively, or thinking negatively toward him/her, without
speciﬁc evidence to support that conclusion’’ (p. 119). The
new items measuring ‘threat conclusion’ could contain
‘mind reading’, but items measuring any other error were
excluded if they contained ‘mind reading’ (e.g., a deleted
‘catastrophizing’ item was: Your softball team is having
practice.Thecoachtellsyouhewouldliketotalktoyouafter
practice.Youthink,‘‘He’snothappywithhowI’mdoingand
doesn’t want me on the team anymore’’). Another cognitive
error is ‘fortune-telling’, deﬁned by Yurica and DiTomasso
2 We thank our colleagues from University of Amsterdam, Professor
Pier J.M. Prins, B.M. Meulema and L.N. Houwer, for their initial
work on the translation of the CNCEQ items.
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negative outcome of a future event or events and believing
this prediction is absolutely true for oneself’’ (p. 119). Only
those CNCEQ items measuring ‘overgeneralizing’ were
permitted to contain ‘fortune-telling’. During the rating no
items other than the ‘overgeneralizing’ items were found to
contain ‘fortune-telling’. Inter-rater agreement on the
exclusionandretentionofitemswas93%(i.e.,agreementon
29 out of 32 items). Disagreements were resolved through
consensus discussion.
The ﬁnal self-report questionnaire comprised 18 items
representing the following ﬁve theoretically-derived sub-
scales: ‘overgeneralizing’ (4 items), ‘personalizing’
(5 items), ‘selective abstraction’ (3 items), ‘threat conclu-
sion’ (2 items), and ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’
(4 items). Based on the aforementioned decision rules, all
six of the items representing ‘catastrophizing’ were
excluded from the questionnaire; ﬁve of these six items
contained ‘mind reading’ and one of the items contained
‘underestimation of the ability to cope’.
3
The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional
Disorders- Short (SCARED-5)
The SCARED-5 is a self-report questionnaire based on the
41-item version of the SCARED (Birmaher et al. 1999).
The SCARED includes 5 factors that parallel the DSM-IV
classiﬁcation of anxiety disorders: ‘panic/somatic’, ‘gen-
eralized anxiety’, ‘separation anxiety’, ‘social phobia’, and
‘simple phobia’. Each item is scored using a 3-point scale
(not true or hardly ever true, sometimes true, often true).
Because the current study was part of a larger study, the
short version of the SCARED (i.e., SCARED-5) was used.
The original authors of the SCARED derived the
SCARED-5 by selecting the highest-loading item on each
of the ﬁve factors. The SCARED-5 has demonstrated good
internal consistency and discriminant validity (Birmaher
et al. 1999).
Results
What is the Factor Structure of the CNCEQ-R?
The range and skewness of item scores derived from
sample 1 were acceptable for the planned analyses, and
there were no outliers in the data. During initial exploratory
analysis of the data an additional two items were
removed (an original ‘overgeneralizing’ item and a new
‘underestimation of the ability to cope’ item). These items
loaded on components not representative of the intended
cognitive error category, and it became evident that the
item content overlapped somewhat with other cognitive
errors. Principal factors extraction with oblique rotation
was then performed with the remaining 16 items of the
CNCEQ-R. An oblique rotation was carried out assuming
that the components would be correlated (Tabachnick and
Fidell 2007). The scree plot resulted in a point of inﬂexion
after the ﬁrst component suggesting a one component
solution. The analysis yielded four components with
eigenvalues [1 (i.e., 4.02, 1.27, 1.18, 1.07) and a ﬁfth
component with an eigenvalue close to 1.00 (i.e., 0.997).
These ﬁve components accounted for 53.37% of the total
variance. The item loadings are presented in Table 1. Items
intended to measure ‘underestimation of the ability to
cope’, ‘selective abstraction’, and ‘overgeneralizing’ loa-
ded on distinct components. Three of the ﬁve ‘personal-
izing’ items loaded onto a distinct component, while the
other two ‘personalizing’ items loaded on a component
together with the two ‘threat conclusion’ items. The four
items in this latter component all reﬂected the cognitive
error of ‘mind reading’, whereas the three ‘personalizing’
items loading on a separate component did not reﬂect the
cognitive error of ‘mind reading’. The ﬁve components
were thus labeled: 1—underestimation of the ability to
cope (UAC), 2—personalizing without mind reading
(PER), 3—selective abstraction (SA), 4—overgeneralizing
(OV), and 5—mind reading (MR). All items loaded on the
respective components at .40 or above, with no cross-
loadings above .40.
Given that the eigenvalue for one of the components was
slightly less than 1, a four-factor solution was also inves-
tigated. The ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’ items
and Leitenberg et al. (1986) original ‘personalizing’ items
merged within one and the same component. Furthermore,
the ‘personalizing’ items had component loadings around
.30 and loaded on more than two components. Thus, the
four factor solution was considered to be less sound, the-
oretically and statistically, relative to the ﬁve factor
solution.
In an attempt to replicate the solution, a ﬁve-factor
model was tested via conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) of
the 16 items of the CNCEQ-R. The data derived from
sample 2 was used for the CFA. No outliers were found,
and item scores had acceptable range and skewness. CFA
was performed using EQS 6.1 for Windows (Bentler
2002). The model was computed using Maximum Likeli-
hood estimation. A number of ﬁt indices and conventions
were examined to test the ﬁve-factor model: The compar-
ative ﬁt index (CFI), the goodness of ﬁt index (GFI), and
the root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)
(Hu and Bentler 1999). CFI and GFI values above .90
3 English and Dutch versions of the CNCEQ-R are available on
request from the ﬁrst author.
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value below .05 indicates an excellent model ﬁt (Browne
and Cudeck 1993).
The results indicated that the ﬁve-factor model repre-
sented an overall good ﬁt to the data, with GFI and CFI
indices indicating a good ﬁt, and RMSEA indicating an
excellent ﬁt: CFI = .93, GFI = .95, and RMSEA = .04. A
one-factor solution was also examined, given that previous
studies of the factor structure of the CNCEQ suggested the
presence of a general dimension of cognitive processing as
opposed to distinguishable cognitive errors. The ﬁt of the
one-factor model was less adequate than the ﬁt of the ﬁve-
factor model (CFI = .84, GFI = .91, and RMSEA = .06).
The results indicated that, although one of the three indices
for the one-factor model was acceptable (i.e., GFI), the
indices for the ﬁve-factor model were superior. The results
of the CFA provided support for the factor structure of the
CNCEQ-R scores established through the PCA.
In sample 1, internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for
the total CNCEQ-R score was .80. The alphas for the ﬁve
subscales were .58, .60, .35, .53, and .62, respectively. It
should be noted that the number of items in the subscales is
small (i.e., 3 or 4), possibly accounting for the lower alphas
for the subscales. Correlation analyses were used to
determine intra-item relatedness (i.e., among the items that
make up each subscale) and inter-item relatedness (i.e.,
between the items of different subscales) (Clark and
Watson 1995). Mean intra-item correlations for each sub-
scale fell inside the range 0 ± .10–0 ± .50, representing
an acceptable level of homogeneity (Nunnally 1978). The
mean intra-item correlations were: .32 for ‘underestimation
of the ability to cope’ items, .33 for ‘personalizing without
mind reading’ items, .15 for ‘selective abstraction’ items,
.27 for ‘overgeneralizing’ items, and .29 for ‘mind reading’
items. All mean intra-item correlations were higher than
the mean inter-item correlations for the ﬁve subscales (.18,
.19, .13, .17, and .17, respectively). Means and standard
deviations for the ﬁve subscales are presented in Table 2,
together with the correlations between the ﬁve subscales.
The correlations between the subscales were all positive
and ranged from medium to small.
Test–retest reliability analyses indicated that the ﬁve
subscales were moderately stable over time, with Pearson
correlation coefﬁcients of .77, .85, .71, .82, and .74,
Table 1 Component loadings of the CNCEQ-R items (PCA, oblique rotation)
Abbreviated description of item-related hypothetical situation (type of error; content area) Component
12345
14. Coping with being very busy with school and social tasks (UAC
b; academic/social) .832 .011 -.037 -.099 -.165
16. Coping with a move involving a new school and friends (UAC
b; general) .619 -.007 .126 -.109 .039
7. Coping with feeling awful after somebody is unkind to you (UAC
b; general/social) .552 -.065 -.168 .030 .318
1. Your team loses a 4-person relay race (PER
a; athletic) .105 -.759 .041 -.025 -.059
3. Your team loses a spelling contest (PER
a; academic) -.004 2.628 -.038 -.046 .290
6. You get a poor grade for a group science project (PER
a; academic) -.094 -.551 .150 -.352 -.015
9. You play basketball and score ﬁve shots and miss two easy shots (SA
a; athletic) .022 -.173 .734 .183 .075
8. You were having a good day at school until the last hour when you did poorly on a quiz
(SA
a; academic)
-.148 .249 .590 -.311 -.013
2. You try out for softball team and get two hits and make two outs (SA
a; athletic) .218 -.315 .497 .085 -.087
4. Some friends ask if you will try out for the school volleyball team; you tried last year and didn’t
make it (OV
a; athletic)
.019 -.215 -.148 -.654 -.012
13. Your class is starting a new unit in math and the last one was very hard (OV
a; academic) .232 .085 -.005 -.625 -.013
11. You forgot some things during a history test last week and now you are having a math test
(OV
a; academic)
.013 -.068 .114 -.615 .172
5. You call a friend to talk about homework and the friend says he/she can’t talk to you now
because someone needs the phone (PER
a; social)
-.132 -.031 -.103 -.019 .859
10. You bought new shoes and when you wear them your friends ask if you have new shoes
(TC
b; social)
.223 .246 .230 -.202 .466
15. You are giving a talk to your class and some of your classmates start laughing (TC
b; social) .333 -.098 .204 .069 .458
12. You are taking skiing lessons and the instructor tells the group that some people are not ready
for the steep trails yet (PER
a; athletic)
.098 -.287 .103 -.099 .417
Loadings[.40 are shown in bold. Component 1 = underestimation of the ability to cope (UAC); Component 2 = personalizing without mind
reading (PER); Component 3 = selective abstraction (SA); Component 4 = overgeneralizing (OV); Component 5 = mind reading (MR)
a Original CNCEQ items: ‘personalizing’ (PER), ‘selective abstraction’ (SA), and ‘overgeneralizing’ (OV)
b Newly added items: ‘underestimation of the ability to cope’ (UAC) and ‘threat conclusion’ (TC)
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123respectively. The correlation coefﬁcient for the test–retest
reliability of the total CNCEQ-R score was .90.
Which Cognitive Errors Predict Anxiety?
Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to
determine which of the negative cognitive error subscales
were the strongest predictors of anxiety. The total
SCARED-5 anxiety score was used as the dependant var-
iable and negative cognitive error scores were entered as
predictors. R for regression was signiﬁcantly different from
zero, F (5, 475) = 23.99, p\.001, with an Adjusted R
2 at
.19. The R
2 value of .20 indicates that 20% of the vari-
ability in anxiety was predicted by negative cognitive
errors. As can be seen from Table 3, the size and direction
of the relationships suggests that higher levels of negative
cognitive errors ‘mind reading’, ‘underestimation of the
ability to cope’, ‘overgeneralizing’ and ‘personalizing’ are
found among children and adolescents with higher levels of
anxiety. Among these four errors, ‘mind reading’, ‘under-
estimation of the ability to cope’, and ‘overgeneralizing’
were the most important, as indicated by the semipartial
correlations. These three error categories had a signiﬁcant
unique contribution in the explanation of anxiety, with
‘underestimation of the ability to cope’ and ‘mind reading’
being the two strongest predictors. The cognitive error
‘personalizing without mind reading’ seems not to be a
unique predictor of anxiety when controlling for all other
negative cognitive errors. The direction of the semi-partial
correlation for the cognitive error ‘selective abstraction’
was negative, indicating that higher levels of this error
were related to lower levels of anxiety when controlling for
the inﬂuence of all other errors.
Discussion
Via the CNCEQ-R—a reﬁnement and extension of Lei-
tenberg et al. (1986) CNCEQ—this study has provided
empirical support for separate negative cognitive error
categories measuring ‘underestimation of the ability to
cope’, ‘personalizing without mind reading’, ‘selective
abstraction’, ‘overgeneralizing’, and ‘mind reading’. Pre-
vious studies of the factor structure of the 24-item CNCEQ,
variously using exploratory (EFA) or conﬁrmatory factor
analyses (CFA), have generally converged on the notion
that the measure consists of just one component repre-
senting negative cognitive processing. The conclusions
from these previous studies were based upon the
researchers’ inspection of the scree plot, the eigenvalues,
component loadings, and ﬁt indices. Similar to these pre-
vious studies, the scree plot in the current study suggested a
one-factor solution. At the same time, the eigenvalues and
component loadings associated with the EFA in the current
study suggested the presence of multiple components. CFA
provided further support for a ﬁve-factor solution, and the
support for a one-factor solution was less strong. The only
other study which has been suggestive of the presence of
multiple CNCEQ components was that of Karakaya et al.
(2007), which made use of EFA. Whereas the components
in Karakaya et al.’s study were somewhat questionable
(e.g., they were based on low item loadings and they were
not clear representations of the separate cognitive error
categories), the current study identiﬁed components rep-
resentative of distinct cognitive error categories and most
loadings were far above the Tabachnick and Fidell (2007)
criterion. It is likely that the unique results of the current
study ﬂow from the close attention paid to the reﬁnement
and extension of the original CNCEQ.
In previous studies on the CNCEQ, scores for the cog-
nitive error categories were highly correlated (e.g., Weems
et al. 2007). The fact that the correlations among the
cognitive error categories of the CNCEQ-R were lower in
comparison with previous studies supports the notion that
the reﬁnement of the item set has lead to improved dif-
ferentiation among cognitive errors. At the same time, the
correlations among the error categories of the CNCEQ-R
were still moderate, suggesting that the error categories are
part of a higher order construct of distorted cognitive
Table 2 Descriptives and Pearson correlations for the ﬁve negative
cognitive error subscales
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
(SD)
(1) UAC – 1.99 (.78)
(2) PER .31 – 2.12 (.84)
(3) SA .24 .31 – 2.06 (.76)
(4) OV .36 .34 .25 – 2.02 (.86)
(5) MR .48 .41 .31 .41 – 2.08 (.77)
UAC underestimation of the ability to cope, PER personalizing
without mind reading, SA selective abstraction, OV overgeneralizing,
MR mind reading
Table 3 Summary of multiple regression analysis predicting anxiety
Variables Bß r Semipartial r
UAC .37* .20 .34* .17
PER .00 .00 .18* .00
SA -.32* -.15 .01 -.14
OV .30* .15 .29* .13
MR .52* .25 .37* .20
UAC underestimation of the ability to cope, PER personalizing
without mind reading, SA selective abstraction, OV overgeneralizing,
MR mind reading
* p\.01
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123processing. The internal consistency of the CNCEQ-R
subscales was low to moderate. This may be due to the
small number of items in the cognitive error categories. At
the same time, mean intra-item correlations were higher
than mean inter-item correlations for the ﬁve subscales,
suggesting the homogeneity of the speciﬁc cognitive error
subscales. The test–retest reliability of the CNCEQ-R
subscales was moderate.
This study also investigated the relation between the
negative cognitive errors in the CNCEQ-R and anxiety.
Consistent with previous research, the results indicated that
‘selective abstraction’ was not associated with anxiety
(e.g., Weems et al. 2001, 2007) and that ‘overgeneralizing’
was associated with anxiety (e.g., Epkins 1996; Weems
et al. 2001). Two subscales containing newly added items
designed to measure negative cognitive errors presumably
characteristic of anxiety (i.e., ‘underestimation of the
ability to cope’ and ‘mind reading’ which contained the
‘threat conclusion’ items) were not only signiﬁcantly
associated with anxiety, but were the two strongest pre-
dictors of anxiety when controlling for the inﬂuence of
other error categories. This result is consistent with the
notion that certain cognitive errors may be differentially
important to the phenomenology of anxiety.
A noteworthy ﬁnding pertains to the relationship
between anxiety and the cognitive process of personalizing.
After the reﬁnement procedure, ﬁve of the six original
items from Leitenberg et al. (1986) ‘personalizing’ sub-
scale remained. Three of these items formed the new
‘personalizing without mind reading’ subscale. For these
three items, the thoughts associated with the hypothetical
scenarios involve an internal attribution for a negative
event (i.e., the negative event would not have occurred ‘‘if I
had been faster’’ or ‘‘if I were smarter’’ or ‘‘if I didn’t do a
lousy job’’). None of these three items include the addi-
tional suggestion of psychological threat (in the form of
‘mind reading’), a construct which is often associated with
anxiety. Previously, researchers have found medium cor-
relations between the original six-item ‘personalizing’
subscale and anxiety (Epkins 1996; Weems et al. 2001,
2007), and two studies found that the ‘personalizing’ sub-
scale signiﬁcantly added to the prediction of anxiety
(Weems et al. 2001, 2007). In the current study, however,
the correlation between ‘personalizing without mind read-
ing’ and anxiety was small, and the ‘personalizing without
mind reading’ subscale did not have a unique contribution
to the prediction of anxiety. Notwithstanding the fact that
the new subscale has fewer items relative to the original
subscale (three versus six), it might be argued that the new
subscale is a more pure measure of ‘internal attributions for
negative events,’ a construct which is linked to depression
(Abramson et al. 1989). Future efforts to determine the
distinct and overlapping cognitive features of anxiety and
depression in youth might make use of this type of purer
measure of personalizing (i.e., uncontaminated by items
which are also associated with psychological threat).
Overall, it appears that the reﬁnement and extension of
the original CNCEQ has yielded a measure which has the
potential to advance research on cognitive processes
associated with internalizing problems in young people. It
is timely that newly added items appear to assess separate
cognitive constructs associated with anxiety, given that
much is still unknown about the role of distorted cognitive
processing in children and adolescents with anxiety
(Stallard 2009; Weems et al. 2007), and given that con-
ceptual overlap between the cognitive constructs associated
with anxiety is regarded as one of the largest limitations of
the existing literature (Starcevic and Berle 2006). To fur-
ther facilitate the study of cognitive processing in anxious
youth, new items could be developed to replace the ‘ca-
tastrophizing’ items which were excluded during reﬁne-
ment of the CNCEQ. In addition, to improve the reliability
of the CNCEQ-R subscales, extra items should be added to
each of the ﬁve subscales. Reﬁnement of the CNCEQ also
meant that some domains were no longer adequately rep-
resented within each subscale (e.g., the ‘overgeneralizing’
subscale no longer contains an item from the ‘social’
domain). Thus, the development of new items ought to
account for adequate coverage of the domains within each
error category. Finally, in line with the current reﬁnement
of the CNCEQ, each new item should be a clear repre-
sentation of the intended negative cognitive error, and it
should not overlap with other error categories included in
the measure.
Future research should focus on replicating the factor
structure found in this study, making use of the 16-item
CNCEQ-R as well as an extended version which incorpo-
rates more items per subscale. Such replication should also
occur in an English-speaking sample of young people.
Ultimately, the factor structure of the CNCEQ-R and
extended versions should be explored among clinical
samples of anxious young people. Moreover, to draw ﬁr-
mer conclusions about the speciﬁcity of the negative cog-
nitive error categories for anxious and depressed children
and adolescents, the CNCEQ-R should be examined among
anxious, depressed, and anxious-depressed young people.
In summary, in response to calls for improved concep-
tualization and assessment of distorted cognitive process-
ing in anxious young people, we developed a revised
version of the CNCEQ. The results from this study suggest
that the CNCEQ-R is comprised of ﬁve empirically-
derived negative cognitive error categories which are dif-
ferentially related to anxiety in youth. With improvements
in the assessment of cognitive errors in young people can
come increased understanding of the role of distorted
cognitive processing in anxiety and depression. This is of
18 Cogn Ther Res (2011) 35:11–20
123direct relevance for treatment given that the focus of
treatment can vary in accordance with cognitive differ-
ences between individuals and disorders (Beck 1988).
Further, in the same way that the CNCEQ has been found
to be a sensitive measure of treatment-related reductions in
distorted processing (Kolko et al. 2000; Silverman, et al.
1999), it is likely that the CNCEQ-R will be of substantial
importance in measuring cognitive change in clinical and
research settings.
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